This paper reports on the situation in Russian higher education since the start of transition, and presents a case study of the finance and budgetary arrangements at the University of Tomsk in some detail. It then illustrates some aspects of the situation in Tomsk with reference to four important issues facing Russia's incompletely reformed economy. These are: (1) ownership, property rights and governance issues; (2) funding issues and the state budget; (3) the tax regime; and (4) non-functioning of the market economy. The paper concludes by highlighting areas in which further reform progress is urgently needed in order to enable universities to function more normally.
Introduction
The idea for this paper came from a visit to Tomsk that took place in May 1997. The authors visited the State University of Tomsk, one of Russia's leading universities with an enviable research record and very good library and computing facilities, and were fortunate enough to be able to interview senior staff of the university concerning their budgets and financial situation. Apparently the situation in Tomsk is not especially bad, indeed it may well be rather better than elsewhere in Russia. But what we learned not only revealed a great deal about the current state of higher education reforms in Russia, but it also provided a snapshot of the state of Russian economic reforms in general. Hence although this paper is partly about Tomsk, it is also about these wider issues.
In what follows, therefore, we proceed as follows. Section 2 summarises some general points about the process of transition to a market economy, outlining the progress already made in Russia. Section 3 is in two parts: first we outline some general issues relevant for the reform of a system of higher education moving away from former, Soviet-type structures, focusing on the Russian situation; then we present the case study of Tomsk. Section 4 examines issues concerning higher education in particular and the reform process more generally, as highlighted in the case study. Section 5 concludes.
Transition to the market
Major changes in the Russian economic and social system since the disintegration of the USSR and collapse of the communist system in late 1991, have been accompanied by an extended decline of GDP, industrial output and the living standards of the population. Some basic indicators about this can be found in EBRD (1995 EBRD ( , 1996 EBRD ( , 1997 . Thus industrial production has declined by a half while overall GDP has fallen by over a third in real terms.
Investment has virtually collapsed.
1 Despite such drastic falls, unemployment has not risen quickly until the last year or so, and remains-officially-well below the levels of most Central and Eastern European countries. This can be explained partly as a result of rapid falls in the real wage, and partly as a desire by workers to retain access to various social benefits provided through their enterprises. 2 In any case, the result is a large fall in average 3 productivity in Russia since the start of transition, though compensated in part by large increases in de novo private sector activity still not yet sufficiently well reflected in official statistics.
Inflation reached a peak of over 1,000 per cent in 1993, declining since then to around 20 per cent in 1997 as the Government's control over monetary policy became increasingly effective.
While most foreign trade with CIS member states and former CMEA partners declined sharply in the early 1990s, Russia has enjoyed large and increasing trade surpluses with the rest of the world, amounting to USD 15-20 billion per annum in recent years. The exports that made this trade success possible have been confined to very few sectors: oil and gas;
timber; other minerals and raw materials. Manufacturing exports have been extremely low.
Moreover, the potential benefits of the trade surplus have been largely offset by substantial capital flight (estimated at over USD 10 billion per annum), reflecting continuing uncertainty about Russian political stability and enduring commitment to reforms.
Nevertheless, these continuing concerns cannot hide the fact that Russia has already made huge progress with market-oriented reforms, especially since 1992 with the introduction of the Gaidar reforms, beginning with extensive price liberalisation. Uniquely amongst the transition economies, Russia proceeded with very rapid privatisation in 1994-based on vouchers issued to the population and special arrangements to enable workers and managers to take controlling interests in most firms-even before basic macroeconomic stabilisation had been achieved. Trade has been substantially liberalised and some notable progress has been made with banking and financial market reforms.
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In significant respects, however, Russia remains quite distant from a well functioning markettype economy, and some of these respects are important for the higher education sector, the main subject of this paper. In a very fundamental sense, one could identify the main source of Russian shortcomings in reforms as a general problem of the state. 4 However, this is not the place for a general review of such a major topic. Instead, we can only highlight here a few features of the reform process in Russia that are still problematic, focusing on features that affect higher education. These features refer to important aspects of the state's functioning, but they only refer to elements of the wider, more complex overall picture. For brevity, attention is confined to just four issues:
(1) Ownership, property rights and governance issues;
Historically, the Russian state has never been subject to the 'rule of law', and this has made the provision of a proper legal framework for a market economy unusually difficult, at least in part due to the lack of the relevant concepts in Russian culture. It is one thing to pass laws and decrees, at which level the Russian business laws are evaluated quite favourably by the EBRD, but something else to implement them effectively in a way that provides a stable and predictable framework for private sector business. Property rights and business contracts are not yet secure in Russia, at least in practice, and many of the basic institutional arrangements needed to support market functioning are not yet fully in place, such as public registers of property titles. Unclear property rights in many spheres also ensure that governance arrangements are usually far from transparent, with important interests often not represented at all.
(2) Funding issues and the state budget;
Under central planning, the major source of budget revenues was the profit of stateowned enterprises, most above-plan profits being centralised for distribution to other sectors and functions. Most investment was financed from budgetary sources, as were extensive subsidies to consumers, and all the social expenditure that is generally regarded as a state responsibility in most countries-i.e. health care, education, defence, public administration, etc. Output decline and the substantial devolution of authority over enterprises away from the centre (even for those not yet privatised) have resulted in a collapse of tax revenues, exacerbated both by disputes between federal and regional authorities over the apportionment of revenues between them, and by mounting tax arrears due to severe payments indiscipline.
Some of these public finance problems reflect failure or incapacity on the part of the Russian state in the 1990s. However, this has not prevented some important steps being taken to overcome them, some of which might also gradually contribute towards the vital process of re-building the state into an effective institution. These steps initially 5 included lax monetary policy that allowed spending to continue even when there was little or no public revenue. But, following a painful learning process, the Russian Government now understands that this is not a sustainable approach. Instead, more recent steps have included various measures of tax reform, both to rationalise and modernise the tax system, and to strengthen its revenue-raising capacity. In addition, many components of spending have been drastically pruned, notably, but not only, defence spending. Many areas, however, including higher education, have effectively been cut back by reducing staff salaries, delaying payments, etc. Such an approach can be tolerated for a short time, but it hardly represents a viable long-term solution.
(3) The tax regime;
The concept of a tax regime includes several elements: what the taxes are and what the rates are (including the level of government at which they are set and imposed); how often the rates and types of taxation are changed; reliability of tax assessments and payments; and, at least in broad terms, some notion of the efficiency of the system. For encouraging business development, what is most important is to have reasonably stable tax rates, based on a moderately rational design, with confidence that assessed taxes will actually be collected fairly. These conditions are far from being satisfied in Russia, in several crucial respects. First, tax rates are often varied, and those applied at different levels do not fit together well. Second, the differentiation of rates for some taxes opens up possibilities of 'bargaining' about the tax rate to be applied to a given firm or product. Such bargaining is a feature of a weak state like Russia, and is best avoided by applying uniform tax rates wherever possible. Third, the definition of the tax base (e.g.
for profits tax) is complicated by the lack of clear and consistent accounting rules and definitions; this can also make tax liabilities appear arbitrary and capricious. Lastly, the apparent ability of many large firms to delay or otherwise avoid paying tax undermines the credibility of the whole system, by sending out the undesirable signal that taxation is essentially voluntary.
(4) Non-functioning of the market economy.
Markets need a lot more than price and trade liberalisation in order to function. They also need a 'culture' in which the market mechanism is broadly trusted and its outcomes 6 socially accepted, as well as a supportive institutional framework. institutions, these problems will slowly be overcome, but at present they are still widespread and serious.
Reforming higher education in Russia

General considerations
5
The thrust of systemic transformation in Russia is to bring about the transition from overwhelmingly administrative government economic management to a predominantly market-oriented economy with regulatory government functions. Many features of the new economic system are not yet clarified and the forms of economic organisation-both in private and (especially) in public goods production-are still unsettled. The issues of the public and private financing of social sector activities, the public and private provision of social services, the limits and effectiveness of privatisation in the social sector are highly debatable within Russian government, in the relevant professional communities and amongst the general public.
All social sector branches are facing similar problems. The first one is a short-run problem of fund-raising to cover operating expenses and current investment expenses in a period of economic and budgetary crisis. Secondly, while long-run development parameters have not yet been determined, there is a need to establish new organisational and management mechanisms that will improve the internal effectiveness of the social sector. The third problem is related to the external effectiveness that is supposed to be increased by the de-statisation of the social sector, developing its public character and developing the system of public reporting of the use of public resources. Both individual and public requirements should be met in this way. And finally there is the fourth problem of overcoming the enormous geographical, social and welfare inequalities of access to social sector services, including higher education.
The Russian system of higher education is one of the largest and most diversified in the world. In the academic year 1993-94, the higher education system in the Russian Federation comprised 548 institutions, 2.5 million students (of which 1.625 million were full-time students) and 228 thousand teaching staff. The only institution that has the privilege of being wholly independent is Moscow State Lomonosov University (MSU). Financing of the higher education system is basically provided by the federal budget, and the academic activities of higher education institutions are coordinated by the SCHE of Russia. Traditionally, research activities in Russia are undertaken by special research institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences or those operating under sector ministries. Therefore, the research function of the universities and other institutions of higher education (IHEs) has been relatively underdeveloped: in 1993 the research budget of higher education was less than 7 per cent of the overall current budget financing of the higher education system, though with considerable variation between institutions.
Governance of the higher education system in Russia is determined by a few basic parameters, including legislation, principles accepted by governing bodies, an institution's status and its mode of operation. The legislative background and key principles of higher education functioning are specified in the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the Law "On Education" adopted in June 1992. The Constitution states that every citizen 'who has passed through the pre-selection process has a right to obtain higher education free of charge in any state-owned or municipal educational institution or at an enterprise' (article 43.3). This article envisages a very significant role of government bodies both in providing and funding higher 8 education. The Law "On Education" stipulates the respective roles of federal and local authorities in education and, in particular, higher education management.
The volume of financing required to maintain a given educational institution in operation is determined by the number of students and the available tangible assets (buildings, equipment, etc.) . Under the planned economy, the relevant branch ministries and Gosplan (State Planning Committee) investigated and analysed the existing demand for specialists, and set up admission parameters which served as a background for the same ministries' or Gosplan calculations of the required funding. The material resources were then provided according to the adopted normatives (technical support services, repairs etc.) which were calculated in accordance with what was available. There was no need for any other system of calculation since abrupt changes in the effective demand for specialists never happened.
Nowadays this system still functions, but there are no longer the former government bodies to determine the demand for educational services and provide the appropriate resources. Branch ministries, in dealing with educational issues, therefore face a twofold problem: first, how to create a new mechanism for revealing the demand for education and, second, how to meet this demand with the required financial resources. Unfortunately, a clear institutional framework, suitable for a market economy has not yet been elaborated.
The SCHE functions, compared to those of branch ministries, are much broader. Besides carrying out various administrative tasks, it should determine the strategy of higher education considered as a sector of the national economy, set up accreditation, licensing and assessment procedures for educational institutions, elaborate a single list of specialities and perform many other general regulating functions. To achieve all this, both ministries and the SCHE need a complete renewal of the higher education system, taking into account the interests of all the stakeholders, including the federal and regional authorities. This entails a process of transition from the former system of purely administrative control to a modern market-oriented higher education management strategy. This could entail a shift towards a strongly decentralised UStype system, with both private and publicly supported institutions; or to a somewhat decentralised UK-type system; or an evolution to something still fairly rule-based and bureaucratic in approach, such as the German system. The interplay between institutional objectives, budgets and financing arrangements was analysed conceptually in Hare (1997b) , but as pointed out there, the general framework of analysis is compatible with many different concrete solutions.
Institutions of higher education in Russia are established as not-for-profit organisations, though they are allowed to use tangible assets to undertake some entrepreneurial activities outside the scope of their designated core mission. Consequently, educational institutions can earn revenues from these activities. What is more, before the new Russian Civil Code was adopted, the laws allowed the institutions to develop their charters themselves and to include any additional mission purposes and directions of activities that they chose. This broadening of educational institutions' activities gave rise to a problem of separating the revenues yielded by 'non-budget activities' as well as the appropriate separate accounting for the noneducational use of educational institutions' assets. The point here is that the existing bookkeeping policy and practices do not make the separation easy to achieve; the calculation of tax obligations and distinguishing the value of property purchased by the institution from the state-owned property are also very complicated. The legislative background for this kind of separation has already been developed by now, and the new Civil Code directly states that the revenues from each type of activity should be accounted for in separate accounts.
Implementing these provisions, however, is not something that can be done overnight (see the Tomsk case study, below).
A further characteristic of the status of educational institutions in Russia is that the SCHE and most other ministries, while taking on the responsibilities of founders, do not act as proprietors who can use the state property at their disposal. According to the relevant Government Decree, the management of state property is the exclusive responsibility of Goskomimushestvo (State Committee for State Property Management) and the laws stipulate that the operational management of state property can be provided by educational institutions themselves in order to maintain the educational process. At the moment, this operative management right can be formalised in contracts that usually restrict the extent to which state assets can be employed in entrepreneurial activities (i.e. those not concerning the educational process but yielding profits). To the extent that Goskomimushestvo controls the use of state property, it also participates in educational management, interacting with educational institutions directly. However, such 'arms length' ownership does not facilitate the most effective governance: in practice, institutions control the use of their assets for educational purposes but in regard to other purposes face some vaguely specified constraints from the ultimate 'owner'; the owner, on the other hand, rarely knows enough about educational processes or the assets held by higher educational institutions to be able to propose more efficient utilisation. The situation is an awkward mix of ownership without responsibility, and responsibility without ownership.
The sources of financial inflows to higher education in the Russian transition economy can be divided into three groups: (1) federal and regional budgets; (2) enterprises and organisations;
(3) private investment. The balance amongst these has changed over time, with the country's federal budget forcing institutions to shift rapidly to increasingly mixed modes of financing.
In 1991 the volume of financing of education was 44 bn roubles, in 1992 it was R 641 bn, and in 1993 an estimated R 5777 bn, which as percentages of GDP in each year amounted to 3.99, 3.54 and 3.56 per cent respectively, and as shares of budget expenditures-8.13, 10.97 and 12.2 per cent respectively. The approved federal budget in 1995 set the volume of financing for higher education at 5100 bn roubles, which was 2.17 per cent of federal budget expenditures; of this, 300 bn roubles was intended for state support of the leading higher education institutions. The budget deficit gap turned out to be so large in many cases that institutions were forced to go beyond their mission-related activities and use informal ways of meeting their financial needs (e.g. leasing space for business firms). Besides that, higher education institutions attempted to obtain supplementary financing from the regions, stretching the limits of the formal rules.
The fact that government expenditures on education are being maintained at the level of about 3.5 per cent of GDP gives an impression of stabilisation. But that is not really correct from several points of view. First of all, major changes occurred in the structure of expenditures of the sector. In the second half of the 1980s the payroll share was rising, but it was just maintaining the existing distortions between the wages of industrial workers and 11 educators. The latter wages were doing no more than following the former with a lag. After the liberalisation of energy prices in the first half of 1992 the payroll share declined because of a sharp increase in payments for utilities (electricity, heating). As a result, additional budget transfers to education not only cannot help the institutions but sometimes even reflect a worsening situation because they cannot match the growth of prices for the services consumed by the higher education institutions. The point here, at least in part, is that to compensate universities and other higher education institutions for Russia's recent inflation, a special, education-specific price index would have to be used, since the cost structure of the sector does not correspond to that of the economy as a whole.
For all budget-financed organisations unified rules are being used to define the amounts of funding, to get them approved and to arrange how to transfer them to the beneficiaries. The The system as sketched here is, for the time being, frozen into its established structure, the level and orientation of educational provision in any given institution being largely given.
There is little evidence of any incentives for organisations either to contract their less effective subject areas or to expand those where they have a clear comparative advantage. Equally, there is not much sign of linkages between educational provision and the state of the labour market.
After the amount of the specific University or institute block grant is determined, the Ministry of Finance is expected to finance it in quarterly instalments. However, of all the items of the that, the costs of education in relation to current average wages and savings are too high to be covered by individual customers of educational and training services (students or their parents). Of course, this raises wider questions about the private and social returns to education that we return to below.
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A special institutional mechanism providing a means of shifting (spreading) an individual's educational expenses into the future is needed to trigger the process of personal investment in higher education on a substantial scale. At present there is no government-sponsored loan scheme in place, and long-term loans from the banks or other capital market institutions are practically unobtainable on any reasonable terms. This is why tuition-based education is currently developing only in the areas of business, applied economics, law and foreign languages where students already expect to have high and stable incomes after completing their studies in these fields. In these areas, the risks of undertaking higher education, and paying for it, are clearly lower than in other areas.
In 1994 the level of tuition fees was rather high even in the public institutions; for example, at the State Academy of Finance it was 3 mn roubles per year (over 1,000 USD), while at the Russian Economic Academy (Plekhanovsky) it was 12,000 USD for the whole 5-year period of studies. In 1994 more than 480 thousand students entered IHEs and did not pay for The gap between the two estimates can be explained in the following terms.
Increased non-budget fund-raising leads to an increase in the 'total revenues' and 'profits'
indicators of educational institutions' official budget statements. This leads to a growth of tax liabilities, which may absorb up to a third of total revenues. Given the severe shortage of financial resources, executives cannot permit this 'dissipation' to occur and various means of tax avoidance are used. One tool for that is an agreement of joint cooperation between educational institutions and businesses, which gives access to extra funds without them appearing in accounting balance sheets. At first sight this seems to be a loophole in the tax 14 laws that ought to be closed. However, important incentive effects are at work, stimulating new links between universities and commercial organisations and generating new and worthwhile activity. Hence the loophole should not be closed without first ensuring that the incentives to engage in these new activities would not be stifled.
Recently, a further important source of financing-local budget means-appeared for educational institutions. Formally, higher education is still an area of federal budget concern, but the role of regions is becoming more significant. The SCHE signed agreements with many local authorities on separating the responsibilities and participating in higher education development. This step was taken in order to attract additional funds from local budgets, so that, for the first time, regions participated in setting up indicators to control admissions.
There is also evidence of financial support provided by local budgets to students. In 1993-94 almost all regions were forced to grant non-interest-bearing credits to educational institutions which could not pay salaries because of delays in transfers from the federal budget.
As already mentioned, the payroll in educational institutions is a 'protected budget item', with (2) The overall macroeconomic and fiscal environment of public higher education remains very uncertain under conditions of continuing economic crisis, systemic change and underdeveloped labour markets; this environment makes planning very inaccurate, and decision-making at all levels of management of IHEs faces substantial risks.
(3) Maintenance of the traditional one-channel state budget funding for most IHEs; the allocation of state funding to existing IHEs on the basis of past spending levels and not 16 for the provision of specified educational services; the lack of the formal window for the regional authorities to participate officially in higher education financing; the weak incentives for private businesses to donate to education, with disincentives for donations strengthened by the tax system and by the institutional management of IHEs.
(4) Persistence of largely non-transparent mechanisms for funding allocation; the inability of new stakeholders to be actively involved in decision-making processes; the persistence of administration as opposed to management; the limited internal accountability in the use of public funds within IHEs; the lack of publicly available information on the operation of HE as a public sector (financial data being regarded as information that should not be publicly available).
(5) Lack of institutionalised IHE-labour market interaction mechanisms that could ensure higher education/labour market feedback and, hence, more response to evolving market signals in restructuring academic programmes and designing new ones.
Case study: Tomsk State University (TGU)
Tomsk University was founded in 1878, the first university in Russia beyond the Urals. It was set up as a research university from the start. Now it has about 12,000 students, 200 full professors (with DSc's) and 1,000 associate professors (with candidate degrees). This gives an effective student-staff ratio of about 10:1, rather low by the standards of most western university systems nowadays.
There are around 40 research institutes, 4 large institutes, including an Institute for Social and Economic Problems of Siberia. The university is a federally funded institution. Each year such institutions are ranked by the State Committee for Higher Education, using criteria to do with a number of academic 'performance' indicators (e.g. numbers of Academicians on the staff, quality and numbers of students, measures of research activity, etc.), and Tomsk currently ranks third in the whole of Russia. (A ranking confirmed by some analysis of university cost functions in Russia being carried out by the authors and others; this is work in progress).
Much research in the past was defence-related, but this has now practically disappeared as defence spending in Russia has been cut back and local defence-industry firms are in serious decline. Some research has been drastically pruned for lack of funds. Now the university has to find new topics or activities that can attract new funding, in order to survive and develop, such as:
• seek external funds, e.g. by setting up courses that attract fee-paying students;
• create special teaching units oriented towards fee-paying students;
• broaden foreign language studies;
• develop international programmes, e.g. some involvement in TEMPUS, some Soros funding, EU-TACIS, and so on. Such ventures obviously depend on the acquisition of foreign language skills.
As far as its budgeting was concerned, Tomsk University did not produce annual reports of the western sort; apparently there is no 'demand' for such reports, and the University might not want to publish the 'truth' about its finances! There was, however, a recently developed and still evolving internal system for finance and accounting and this produced an annual financial report for internal use. At present the university administration looks only 2-3 years ahead (not surprisingly, in view of recent turbulence in the Russian public finances), with no real strategic planning. The aim is to avoid external shocks, dampen internal tensions, with internal systems of control and financing based on multi-level motivation. Formerly, motivation was patriotic, political, or based on discipline. Now finance and material incentives become more important, though in parallel, financial responsibility is also developing.
In the past, virtually all the budget came from above (i.e. from the SCHE), but it was very inflexible and strictly itemised. Hence if the university needed extra money, or just to switch from one budget heading to another, the Rector would have to seek permission from higher levels. Now there is more flexibility, but with a budget that is constrained in other ways.
18
There are five channels through which the university receives its money (figures refer to 1996):
(i) state budget
The university prepares a proposed budget each year (based on estimated or planned spending), and submits this to the SCHE. The ministry first decides which parts of the budget it will approve, but it then only paid out around 60% of the approved total in 1996 (see Table 1 , below). Thus of approved salaries, 100% was paid (though sometimes with a delay), but for maintenance, utilities, and equipment (incl. books) nothing was paid, and for social aid to students, only 20% of the approved total was paid.
(ii) non-budget sources earned by the university
This can include a variety of items:
• earnings by faculties from student fees for commercial courses, business courses, etc.;
• individual research carried out by members of the faculty;
• grants brought in by the international office;
• other general funds brought in by the university.
Examples of commercial activities include the following:
(a) The Russian-American College of Humanities, was initially set up as a private venture with one specialism, namely international business. The college was selfreliant, funded wholly through student fees. Then Ohio State University obtained USAID funding to help develop higher education in Siberia, with Tomsk State University as one of the partners. Hence the college linked into this programme. In education, the conditions are very unfavourable for private sector institutions, with high rates of taxation (e.g. the college even had to pay a special tax for using the word 'Russian' in its name!) and problems over licensing and accreditation. So the college became part of TGU and adopted its present name. Though formally part of TGU now, the college receives none of the university's income from the federal budget, and contributes 25 per cent of its fee income to the university.
Also the college has had to adapt to evolving state education standards in its field, which was easier as part of the university. Contracts with teachers are for giving specific courses, and are paid from fees. Within the college, there are 170 students in the department of economics (4 year course), 200 in public administration (5 year course), these being part-time students, mostly working in the local administration. Overall, this comes to about 300 full-time equivalents (FTEs). The college is also starting to produce and publish its own course material, e.g. a short book on mathematics for economists.
(b) The School of Business includes three specialisms: law, international relations, and business & management. There are 500 students, all evening or other part-time students, though a full-time programme will start in Autumn 1997. The operation is completely commercial, receiving nothing from the state budget and contributing 25 per cent of its fee income to the university. As part of the university, the School does not pay tax on its business income.
Various overhead recovery rates apply to the four non-budget sources and different proportions are kept by the centre and the faculties concerned. For the last two items, 100 per cent is retained by the centre, for the first two a share of up to 50
per cent is centralised, depending on the situation. For example, in physics or mathematics there is little local demand for the skills of the best staff, but they can raise international grants to boost their salaries and to enable them to travel. They keep all the money raised in this way. In the law faculty, where there is strong competition for good staff and supplementary fees can be charged, half the extra revenue is used to raise staff salaries.
(iii) treatment of energy and other utilities
Here the university receives no budget and cannot pay; after negotiation, these debts are just written off as far as the university is concerned. Clearly, this 'system' is economically irrational, since it implies that the utilities and energy supplies are effectively supplied free to the university. This could not possibly be the stable, long run position, a point we refer to again below.
In a similar vein, the university also engages in barter deals at times; e.g. on one
occasion it was paid in tyres (!) for an external contract, and then successfully sold the tyres to raise cash. This example is referred to again below.
(iv) sponsors and donations
The university maintains links with alumni, who support the university both through general and specific means (e.g. to create a new chair). The university pays taxes to the federal budget, 39 per cent of the wage and salary bill, to cover social security and pensions. According to the Law on Education, all income earned by the university and put back into education is not subject to tax. However, staff undertaking outside work on a private basis to boost their income does raise tax issues, as the additional income should be taxed. For this reason, it was accepted that the tax police need to be on campus (!). According to the law, university professors should not set up private companies using the university's name without both contributing to the university and paying tax. But this area is poorly regulated and local arrangements are being developed. On wages, there are standard federal scales covering university staff as outlined above. But these official scales are very low and the supplements paid on the basis of additional, revenue-raising activity can sometimes multiply basic salaries by a factor of 10.
For 1996, the university's research budget was R 12.235 bn to support collective/university activity, of which R 5.1 bn came from the state (federal) budget as basic finance, R 3.49 bn was won in competitive bids from state bodies funding scientific/ technological programmes and projects, and R 3.85 bn came from enterprises commissioning research. The first category of funding brings no overhead contribution, the second 5-10 per cent, the third 15-30 per 22 cent, these recoveries being included in the above figures. Given the difficult situation of many firms (and the shift away from defence), it is not surprising that the enterprise contribution is less than half what it would have been in 1992.
As far as corporate governance is concerned, Tomsk finds itself in a very awkward position.
In Russia, institutions like Tomsk are very much on their own and the institutional infrastructure is very poor. Formerly (i.e. under the old, communist system), a structure 
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There can be some difficult juggling of finances to make it possible to meet particular spending peaks, e.g. summer wage payments (two months' salary is paid in advance). 7 This suggests that financial reserves are very low: in fact reserves were held in the past for wages, student stipends, and special needs, but now reserves are only held to cover the stipendiums-the tax regime makes holding the other reserves unattractive. Interest of 40 per cent per annum could be earned on reserves held as bank deposits. 8 Alternative, safe financial assets are hardly available even now in Russia.
It can be seen from this short case study that even a leading Russian university faces serious problems at the present stage of the country's transition to the market. These problems can be summed up under the four headings highlighted in Section 2, which are discussed further below with particular reference to the higher education sector:
(1) ownership, property rights and governance issues;
(2) funding issues-the state budget, fees and other income sources;
(3) the tax regime for universities; and (4) non-functioning of the market economy.
Transition problems as illustrated by Russian higher education
Ownership, property rights and governance issues
Who 'owns' universities in Russia, and what does this imply for the use of their assets and, more generally, for their governance? This question cannot at present be answered precisely, though many of those concerned with reforms in Russian higher education seem to think that it must be answered as part of the reform process. But higher education models in OECD countries suggest that vagueness is not necessarily a recipe for corruption and inefficiency.
For instance, in the UK, universities are institutions established by Royal Charter (by the Privy Council) enjoying charitable status for their strictly educational activities, mostly funded from government sources (via several different channels). In Germany, universities are state (or Länder) institutions whose staff are civil servants, and whose activities are governed by complex rules and procedures. Institutions operating in both of these models are publicly accountable for the public money they spend, and they have both proved themselves capable of adapting to changing circumstances in the higher education 'market' while supporting very high quality research and teaching.
In Russia, therefore, the problem is not so much that university assets are mostly stateowned, with possible solutions being thought of in terms of privatisation or wider use of the market mechanism per se; it is rather the lack of accountability and effective governance that condemns a good deal of the system to inefficient operation. Thus the interesting question is how this situation can be improved. It is easy to think of some simple steps: 
Funding issues
We saw that the federal budget was the main source of income for universities, but that it is becoming increasingly unreliable, forcing institutions to seek other income sources such as fee-paying students, research funds from other government agencies (for which competitive bidding is often used), and various commercial activities. Ensuring budget balance by forcing down wage rates to absurd levels is no solution, since that results in a dearth of younger talent willing to work in the universities, either to teach or to undertake research; the better of the existing academic staff will also either start to leave, or they will find alternative income sources to boost their meagre university pay. In the medium to longer term, real wage rates must rise, 9 and institutional budgets must rise accordingly. Of course, that does raise the question about where the money might come from.
Part of the answer is provided by the discussion under the next two sub-headings. The other part of the answer depends on a restructuring of the higher education system, with a combination of rationalisation (closing a few of the least effective institutions), expanding new income sources (fees, research grants, industrial support, etc), and increasing budgetary support as the economy recovers from the recent depression and resumes real growth. In this connection it is important to stress, given the low student-staff ratios referred to above, that there are only two main routes to significantly higher university pay: (a) productivity gains;
and (b) staff cuts. Hence discussions of restructuring the Russian higher education system that fail to address this aspect of the problem are doomed to fail. Russian academics must either adapt to cope with massively increased student numbers (with the existing staffing levels), or there must be severe cutbacks in staffing levels while student numbers remain substantially unchanged.
A key problem with the present situation is that because basic academic pay is so low, professors and lecturers have strong incentives to seek other, sideline jobs to boost their incomes. Since it is, in practice, very hard for universities to monitor closely the activity of their staff, these incentives almost inevitably result in lower academic productivity, with courses revised infrequently, students given little attention, little research being done, little income generation for their institutions as opposed to for themselves, and so on. Thinking along these lines, an efficiency wage case can be made for higher academic pay in Russia, but that can only be financed as indicated above. Hence moving in this direction presents the system with an enormous challenge.
The tax regime for universities
An issue that is quite problematic for Russian universities is the tax treatment of the various income flows associated with their diverse activities. Although a subject of widespread complaint, it is perfectly normal for the universities to pay the same payroll taxes as other sectors, in order to provide social insurance and pension contributions for their employees; so these taxes, although set at relatively high rates, are not really the main problem. The more awkward issue is the taxation of 'profits' resulting from teaching and research, where the present situation seems far from clear, both because of the ambiguous legal status of universities, and because of the plethora of arbitrary taxes against which university authorities have no effective means of redress.
Formally, universities are not-for-profit organisations, at least in respect of activities concerned with their educational functions, and to the extent that surpluses (if any) are ploughed back into education. However, there are still many problems over the definitions of income and profit for tax purposes, and the boundary lines between educational and strictly commercial activities are also not clearly drawn. As a result, institutions cannot be sure what their tax liability will be in regard to particular activities, which creates obvious incentives for dissimulation and outright corruption. Similar points could be made about the tax treatment of universities in relation to VAT, where again there is scope for corruption. These problems are particularly serious in Russia because the relevant laws are either incomplete or only provide a broad outline of the given tax, leaving a great deal to local interpretation. At the same time, there is little provision for widely publicising general rulings about taxation, and even less possibility for institutions to challenge improper decisions about taxation through the courts. Hence universities, like enterprises in general, are often at the mercy of local officials. This is an aspect of the general point made earlier, concerning the uncertainty of the economic environment for business (regarding universities, for purposes of this remark, as part of business).
Non-functioning of the market economy
As we have shown, universities are functioning in an economic climate in which there remain many highly irrational and inefficient, non-market modes of conducting transactions. Here we expand on three instances of this phenomenon that were noted above:
(1) The use of barter (e.g. the tyres example referred to in section 3.2(iii))
It is a standard view in economics that while barter may be better than 'no trade', it is almost always a highly inefficient mode of trade. Hence when we observe a situation where barter is not only occurring, but is quite widespread, we have to ask what are the constraints faced by the agents involved; in other words, why do they even consider barter, knowing it to be normally inefficient. Several answers can be given which, taken together, add up to a reasonably clear picture.
First, the example cited above seemed to be a case where the firm doing business with the university was good at production but had very poor marketing skills. Hence it lacked liquidity, was unable to pay the university in cash, and had to resort to a delivery of tyres. On the other hand, the university evidently does possess marketing skills as it was able to sell the tyres and make the money it needed. This mismatching of skills suggests that the university and firm might be able to find mutually profitable ways of working together whereby the university would help the firm (and other firms) to improve its (their) marketing skills. Second, a curious feature of the above example is the very fact that the university was willing to accept such a form of 'payment', since it implies that the university itself is so illiquid that it could not afford to delay payment until cash was available. Third, it would appear that firms engaging in barter must be facing extremely severe capital market constraints as they are apparently unable to borrow against future income streams, even short term. Alternatively, it may be that the costs of doing so are simply considered prohibitive; or the banks may not yet be able to 28 provide the sort of short term credits that firms need in a timely and efficient manner.
Finally, the whole situation is illustrative of an economy which is only partially monetised, and where the normal laws of contract (which, in most countries, specify payment by cash, cheque or bank transfer as the only acceptable modes) are not yet very meaningful.
(2) Forced subsidies (e.g. allowing universities to receive free energy)
Effectively, Tomsk State University was allowed to consume energy at no cost. On the one hand it received no approved budget from the Government to cover energy costs, so could reasonably argue that it was unable to pay. On the other hand, the utility companies either do not pay, under-pay or delay their payments of taxes due to the Government, which is partly why the latter provided no budget for energy to the university. The year-end deal whereby the University's utility charges were just written off, notionally against the unpaid tax liabilities of the companies, has a certain logic to it. But as we remarked above, it is an economic nonsense since there is no justification for allowing the universities (or any other institution, for that matter) to act as if their energy was free. What is needed, therefore, is a combination of reform steps that eliminates such obvious and costly irrationality, perhaps along the following lines:
(a) gradually enforce timely tax collection from the utilities (and other companies, as there is no need to single out this category for special treatment), with large (and enforced!) penalties for late payment;
(b) ensure that budget-supported organisations like the universities receive allocations in the budget to cover their use of energy and other utilities, these being priced in a proper, economic way to provide strong incentives for economising on their use.
(c) compel users of the utilities to pay by, where necessary, cutting off their energy supplies in the event of persistent non-payment, and again with penalties for late payment. There is no point in operating a price system under which payment is, in the end, largely voluntary.
This sort of package may sound harsh, but its introduction is necessary in order to provide incentives for the efficient use of energy-and of resources in general-in the market economy. It is not the responsibility of public utility companies to subsidise the universities, or anyone else, and in the few instances where subsidies might be justified in the longer term they should be paid by the Government itself directly to the agents concerned. The ensures that where subsidies continue they are transparent, and hence open to regular review to monitor both their effectiveness and their justification.
(3) Balancing budgets by holding down wages
Wages paid to various occupations reward experience and responsibility, and stimulate labour market choices and mobility. Hence the low wages paid in Russian budgetsupported institutions, including the universities, guarantee that good people already there will either have to leave, engage in corrupt activities to supplement their income, or undertake legal sideline activities to boost their incomes. Often, these sideline activities can detract considerably from the main work of the employing institutions, their core teaching and research. Such low wages also ensure that, for the most part, high quality and productive young people will not choose to work in the universities.
Hence with present policies, it is absolutely certain that the Russian university system will experience a period of steady decline in its quality. Since the proportion of young people entering university in Russia is low compared to most OECD countries, it is hard to believe that in the long run this will prove to be an outcome acceptable to the Russian Government. So what can be done to remedy this situation?
The simple answer is to raise wages dramatically. But this is unlikely to be sufficient without substantial revisions to academics' employment contracts limiting the amount of outside work they are allowed to do or redefining it to be part of normal duties, attracting little or no extra pay. For most people in Russian universities, at present, their university job does not provide the main part of their income, and any reform of the wage structure must address that serious anomaly as indicated above. Academics 30 should be able to do a normal job and receive a normal, adequate income for their work, without having to take on extra jobs in order to survive. 10 On the other hand, in return for this they should indeed treat their academic jobs as full-time jobs. A combination of productivity gains and staff cuts seems unavoidable.
Conclusions
This paper has outlined the main features of the Russian economic reforms since 1991, and then discussed the Russian higher education system, noting the difficult conditions in which it finds itself. These were illustrated with reference to the case study of Tomsk State University.
As the last section indicated, many of the problems of the university system can be (1) completion of price reforms to include the public utilities; prices must be meaningful in the sense that agents should not receive supplies that they are unwilling to pay for;
(2) clarification and effective enforcement of the tax regime governing the universities (including provision for appeals against allegedly unfair tax rulings, and a high degree of transparency in the administration of the tax laws);
(3) further reforms of the banks and credit system with a view to eliminating, as rapidly as possible, the need to engage in economically inefficient barter transactions; and (4) reforms to the wage system to ensure that university staff are adequately paid for doing their main job, in return for large productivity improvements.
These reforms are all urgent, part of a wider package to inject a higher degree of economic rationality into the Russian economy and, as a by-product, into the higher education system.
31
Within higher education itself, it is very likely that further changes will be needed, to do with the financing arrangements for institutions and students. However, to assess how to approach these issues in Russia, we expect that something along the lines of the recently completed Dearing Committee which studied higher education in the UK would be necessary, resulting in a comprehensive report with detailed recommendations.
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Endnotes
1.
Though not the subject of this paper, it should be borne in mind here that the measurement of items in Russian national accounts suffers from severe deficiencies, both conceptual and concerning coverage. On the latter, much of the hidden or 'grey' economy is not yet picked up in official statistical data.
2.
Real wages in Russia have been more flexible than those in most CEE countries, partly because benefits are low and of uncertain availability; for some detailed analysis of this issue, see Commander et al. (1996) .
3.
For general reviews of the Russian economic reforms at various stages of their evolution, see: EBRD Transition Report, various years; Layard and Parker (1996) ; Granville (1995) ; Aslund (1995) .
4.
The general problem of the state and its role in economic development is the theme of this year's World Development Report; see World Bank (1997) .
5.
This section draws heavily on Lugachyov et al. (1997) .
6. Using PPP exchange rates, this figure would be about three times as high.
7.
It should be remembered, in this regard, that salaries in Russia are still almost invariably paid in cash. Hence academics cannot simply rely on their salaries being transferred to their bank accounts at the proper time. In particular, if they were away on holiday they would not have access to any money unless they were paid in advance for the holiday period.
8.
It should be noted that this would be the nominal rate in 1996, and actual rates will now be lower; the real rate will be even lower and has not even always been positive.
9. An important benefit of this will be that supplementary wages for additional activities will no longer be totally disproportionate to the basic wage, as is often the case now.
10. Obviously, one cannot propose a general, large increase in public sector wages without also addressing the overall public finance implications. In other words, one has to specify how the wage increases will be met (e.g. by improved tax collection, economic growth that boosts public revenues, etc.) and how they should relate to wages paid elsewhere in the economy. These are important questions that we do not cover in the present paper.
11. For the report of the UK's Dearing Committee, see Dearing (1997) .
